The action for annulment is one of the fundamental remedies within the European Union legal system, enshrined in Article 263 TFEU, and constitutes the principal means by which the Court of Justice of the European Union exercises judicial review over the legality of acts adopted by the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.
Its function is the protection of the rule of law within the EU, ensuring that the exercise of public powers remains consistent with the Treaties and with general principles of Union law. In theory, the action for annulment could serve as an essential instrument for individuals and non-governmental organisations seeking to contest Union acts that directly affect fundamental rights or collective interests, such as environmental protection. In practice, however, the admissibility criteria developed by the Court of Justice have created significant obstacles, particularly for NGOs, whose raison d’être is precisely the defence of diffuse and transnational interests that do not easily fit within the classical model of “direct and individual concern”.
The jurisprudential framework that has historically governed NGO access to the EU judicature is marked above all by the celebrated Plaumann formula, according to which an applicant must demonstrate that an EU measure affects them in a manner which differentiates them from all other persons, just as if they were themselves the addressee of the act.
This demanding threshold has, for decades, confined the possibilities of NGOs to pursue an action for annulment to a very limited set of circumstances, effectively excluding the judicial review of many acts that bear directly on the environment and biodiversity, but that are conceived as measures of general application.
Against this backdrop, the objective of the present contribution is to explore the locus standi of NGOs in the context of the action for annulment, highlighting the tension between the traditional Plaumann test and the more recent developments introduced by Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006, as amended to implement the Aarhus Convention. The analysis will also situate this issue within broader debates on access to justice in the EU legal order, with particular reference to environmental protection, where the legal standing of NGOs plays a pivotal role in ensuring effective judicial control. T
his article further connects with our previous discussion concerning the possibility of initiating an action for annulment before the General Court against the Council’s decision to downlist the protection status of the wolf (in Italian). That case illustrates how NGOs may attempt to challenge Union measures that, although not addressed to them individually, have profound implications for biodiversity and collective goods.
Action for annulment — Legal framework under Article 263 TFEU
The action for annulment, as provided by Article 263 TFEU, represents the primary legal avenue through which the Court of Justice of the European Union exercises control over the legality of Union acts. The provision establishes a complex system of judicial review that reflects both institutional balance and the need for effective legal protection. It distinguishes among three categories of potential applicants: privileged, semi-privileged and non-privileged.
Privileged applicants, namely the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Member States, may bring an action for annulment without the need to demonstrate any specific interest, thus enjoying unfettered access to judicial review. Semi-privileged applicants, such as the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors and the Committee of the Regions, may also act, albeit only to safeguard their prerogatives.
The most delicate category is that of non-privileged applicants, which includes natural and legal persons. Their standing is subject to particularly stringent conditions, reflecting the restrictive jurisprudence that has developed over decades.
For non-privileged applicants, Article 263 TFEU requires that an action for annulment may be brought only if the contested act is addressed directly to them, or if it is of both direct and individual concern, or, following the Treaty of Lisbon, if it constitutes a regulatory act that is of direct concern and does not entail implementing measures. Each of these conditions raises interpretative challenges that have been clarified, but also narrowed, by the Court’s case law. In particular, the notions of “direct concern” and “individual concern” have generated extensive doctrinal debate, as they function as decisive filters for admissibility.
The criterion of direct concern requires that the act directly affect the applicant’s legal position without leaving discretion to the addressees responsible for its implementation. The requirement of individual concern, by contrast, demands that the applicant be distinguished from all other persons in a manner comparable to the addressee of the act, a formula originating in the well-known Plaumann judgment.
This framework has profound implications for NGOs wishing to contest Union acts. Because their statutory mission is typically the defence of collective and diffuse interests, NGOs rarely fulfil the condition of individual concern. Consequently, their capacity to bring an action for annulment has often been excluded, even in cases involving environmental measures of wide-ranging impact.
Action for annulment — The Plaumann doctrine and the requirement of individual concern
The most significant jurisprudential obstacle for NGOs wishing to bring an action for annulment is found in the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the requirement of individual concern. This interpretation was crystallised in the landmark Plaumann v Commission judgment of 1963, in which the Court held that natural or legal persons may be regarded as individually concerned by a measure of general application only if that measure affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by circumstances that differentiate them from all other persons, thereby assimilating them to the position of the addressee.
This so-called Plaumann formula has become the canonical test for individual concern, and it has had far-reaching implications for the admissibility of an action for annulment initiated by non-privileged applicants.
The rigidity of this test is particularly problematic for NGOs. By their very nature, NGOs act in defence of collective interests, such as the protection of the environment, biodiversity or public health, which extend well beyond the individualised sphere of a particular person or entity. Under the Plaumann doctrine, however, applicants must show that they are affected in a manner distinct from all others in a comparable situation, a condition rarely met by NGOs that represent diffuse interests. As a result, numerous actions for annulment lodged by environmental organisations have been dismissed as inadmissible, the Court reasoning that the harm invoked was not specific to the applicant but rather a matter of general concern to society at large.
Action for annulment — The Aarhus Regulation and internal review as a gateway
The limitations imposed by the Plaumann doctrine have long been criticised for their incompatibility with the principle of effective judicial protection and with international commitments undertaken by the European Union. A decisive turning point was represented by the adoption of Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006, known as the Aarhus Regulation, which was designed to implement within the Union legal order the obligations arising from the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. The Regulation, later amended in 2021, introduced an innovative procedural mechanism that significantly reshaped the position of NGOs in relation to the action for annulment.
The Aarhus Regulation provides, in particular, that qualified NGOs and members of the public may submit a request for internal review of administrative acts adopted by Union institutions or bodies, or of alleged omissions where such acts should have been adopted, on the grounds that they contravene environmental law. If the request is rejected, the applicant may then institute proceedings before the General Court in accordance with Article 263 TFEU.
This mechanism operates as a procedural gateway, ensuring that organisations which defend environmental interests are not excluded ab initio from judicial scrutiny. While the definition of “administrative act” and the scope of “environmental law” remain carefully circumscribed, the internal review procedure has nonetheless provided NGOs with a practical route to challenge decisions and to obtain access to the Union Courts in circumstances where a direct action for annulment would otherwise have been inadmissible.
The 2021 amendment to the Aarhus Regulation was particularly significant. It followed the findings of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, which had criticised the Union for maintaining barriers to access to justice. The revised Regulation broadened the definition of reviewable acts and clarified the obligations of Union institutions in responding to requests. For NGOs, this reform translated into a concrete possibility to test the legality of acts that impact environmental protection, thereby recalibrating the restrictive equilibrium shaped by the Plaumann case law. As a result, the Aarhus Regulation represents a corrective instrument designed to reconcile the Union’s judicial architecture with international standards of access to justice.
Action for annulment — The General Court’s Bloom judgment and NGO locus standi
A significant development in the evolution of NGO access to justice within the European Union occurred with the General Court’s judgment of 23 July 2025 in Bloom v Commission (T-1049/23). The case concerned the decision of the European Commission to object, on behalf of the Union, to a resolution of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) that sought to regulate the use of fish aggregating devices (FADs) in order to preserve tuna stocks and mitigate ecological harm.
The NGO Bloom, supported by Blue Marine Foundation, lodged a request for internal review under the Aarhus Regulation, arguing that the Commission’s objection violated the precautionary principle and undermined Union environmental law. The Commission rejected the request as inadmissible, contending that its objection did not constitute an “administrative act” containing provisions capable of contravening environmental law.
The General Court annulled the Commission’s decision, holding that the objection was indeed capable of producing adverse effects on the attainment of the objectives of EU environmental policy enshrined in Article 191 TFEU, and could therefore be subject to internal review. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasised that the Aarhus Regulation must be interpreted in a manner consistent with its objective of guaranteeing effective access to justice.
It further clarified that even measures which do not alter the state of Union environmental law directly may still qualify as reviewable acts if they prevent or impede the adoption of international conservation measures. The judgment thus confirmed that the internal review procedure operates as a functional extension of the action for annulment, enabling NGOs to overcome the rigid barriers of the Plaumann doctrine.
The importance of Bloom v Commission lies in its recognition of the substantive role of NGOs in safeguarding environmental values at both Union and international level. By broadening the category of acts susceptible to challenge through internal review, the judgment strengthens the legitimacy of the Union’s legal order and enhances the effectiveness of judicial protection. It illustrates how the combined effect of the Aarhus Regulation and the action for annulment has begun to recalibrate the balance between institutional discretion and the right of civil society actors to contest decisions with far-reaching environmental consequences.
Action for annulment — Substantive standards: precaution, sustainability, and environmental objectives
Beyond the procedural barriers that condition admissibility, the success of an action for annulment brought by NGOs often depends on the substantive standards invoked before the Union Courts. In the environmental field, the most prominent of these is the precautionary principle, expressly enshrined in Article 191 TFEU and elaborated in a consistent line of case law.
The precautionary principle requires Union institutions to adopt protective measures even in the presence of scientific uncertainty, ensuring that the absence of complete data cannot serve as a justification for delaying or avoiding regulatory intervention. NGOs, by framing their arguments in terms of breaches of this principle, can underscore how contested acts undermine the very objectives of Union environmental policy.
Equally relevant is the principle of sustainable development, which informs both primary law and sectoral legislation such as the Common Fisheries Policy and biodiversity protection measures. When NGOs bring an action for annulment, they often emphasise that contested acts compromise the prudent and rational use of natural resources or diminish ecological resilience, thereby infringing the obligations arising under Article 191 TFEU.
In addition, the Courts have recognised the relevance of international commitments, including those derived from conventions such as Aarhus, in shaping the interpretative framework within which Union acts must be assessed. By situating their claims within this broader normative matrix, NGOs strengthen the argument that annulment is not only legally justified but also necessary to preserve the coherence of the Union’s legal order.
These substantive standards thus transform the action for annulment into more than a procedural vehicle. They enable NGOs to invoke principles of environmental law that carry constitutional weight within the Union system, thereby pressing the Courts to balance institutional discretion against the imperative of ecological protection. In this way, substantive law and procedural access intersect, reinforcing the central role of judicial review in safeguarding the environment and in granting NGOs a meaningful voice before the Union judicature.
Legal assistance and representation before the EU Courts. We take care of your case
The complexity of the legal framework governing the action for annulment makes professional assistance the “key factor” for NGOs wishing to contest acts of the Union before the General Court or, on appeal, before the Court of Justice. The admissibility thresholds, the procedural requirements, and the strategic interplay between direct actions, internal review under the Aarhus Regulation, and preliminary references demand a level of expertise that can only be provided through specialised legal representation.
In particular, the preparation of an application for annulment requires not only a detailed understanding of the substantive principles of Union environmental law, but also a sophisticated assessment of locus standi under the Plaumann doctrine and its subsequent developments.
Our law firm has acquired significant experience in assisting NGOs in framing their legal strategies within the Union judicial system, including the drafting of internal review requests under Regulation No. 1367/2006 and the preparation of comprehensive submissions for the General Court.
Article drafted and published in collaboration with Attorney Mariachiara Giovinazzo